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TrYeperfy of 
M A R T I N P C A T H E R W O O D L I B R A E 
NEW YORK STATE SCHOOL 
INDUSTRIAL ANO LABOR RELATIONS 
Cornell University 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR -- U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 
MINUTES OF MEETING HELD ON WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 1994 
The Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations met in 
Washington, DC on Wednesday, April 6, 1994 to consider issues in the 
area of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). Present were Chairman 
Dunlop and members Voos, Fraser, Marshall, Kochan, Turner, Freeman and 
Usery. Absent were Allaire and Kreps and Counsel Weiler. Designated 
Federal Official June Robinson attended the meeting. The Chair 
announced that the record of the factfinding portion of the Commis-
sion's work will close on April 29. The record will reopen at a later 
date for comments in the recommendations phase of its work. 
The morning's panel presented the views of attorneys and others 
representing unions, management, and individual workers, as well as 
persons involved in ADR. Attorney Charles G. Bakaly, Jr. of O'Melvaney 
and Myers representing employers submitted a written statement. In 
oral remarks he described his personal odyssey from believing that 
strikes should be subject to injunction to his present-day support for 
binding arbitration ("I guess it's time to quit!"). Indeed, he is 
planning a second career as a mediator. Bakaly stated that arbitration 
is alive and well -- it is less expensive and much quicker than 
litigation; it relieves courts of part of their growing burden, and 
contrary to past practice, arbitrators these days can resolve all kinds 
of disputes (his agreements to arbitrate even include trade secret 
violations) and provide remedies of the kinds available in court: 
equitable relief, punitive damages, etc. He noted that a contract of 
employment under common law is not specifically enforceable, that a 
person unjustly dismissed cannot get his or her job back, but an 
arbitrator can give that remedy. Some problems with respect to the 
resort to arbitration were noted: it is not cheap, and discovery may 
be quite limited. 
Chairman Dunlop interjected with a reference to a NY Times article 
from the preceding day which described findings of a GAO report on 
arbitration in the securities industry. (The article begins: "...at a 
time when more employees are compelled to submit complaints of job 
discrimination and sexual harassment to arbitration, the people who 
decide the cases are overwhelmingly white men in their 60's with little 
experience in labor law." Apr; 5, p. B6) Dunlop stated that Bakaly's 
assessment on specific questions such as when the agreement to 
arbitrate should occur, selection of arbitrators, and whether and how 
to mediate would be more useful to the Commission than a recital of the 
arguments for and against arbitration per se. Bakaly responded with a 
description of a situation involving an HMO with about 400 doctors of 
whom two-thirds have signed an agreement to arbitrate disputes (an 
incentive to sign was provided in the form of a good severance 
package) . He views this result as excellent. (New hires will be to 
sign the agreement to arbitrate.) 
He urged also that the agreement to arbitrate be separate from the 
employment contract, since a recent Supreme Court decision (Gilmer 
1991, an ADEA case arising in the securities industry) leaves some 
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uncertainty as to the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act's exclusion 
of employment contracts of workers in interstate commerce: in essence, 
does the exclusion apply to all workers or just those in the transpor-
tation industry? [Much discussion throughout the hearing addressed the 
desirability of clarifying the law under Gilmer and prior leading case 
in the area, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver (1974, arbitration under a 
collective bargain agreement (CBA), apparently does not preclude sub-
sequent judicial resolution of a civil rights claim.] 
Paul H. Tobias, a plaintiff's lawyer in Cincinnati and founder of 
the National Employment Lawyers Association, also expanded on his 
written statement. He provides representation in unjust dismissals to 
individuals from CEOs through professors to floor sweepers. In his 
view the best form of ADR is when employers and employees resolve their 
own disputes. But he sees a clear need for the Commission to educate 
the public, and employers particularly, about mediation and arbitration 
-- "employers don't respond to reason and moral suasion. He always 
asks for alternative dispute resolution as part of his lawsuits, and 
employers reject the request. 
Attorney Tobias argued, in summary, that informal methods of 
private dispute resolution should be tried first, that the Commission 
should support mediation of disputes early on (he "didn't come over on 
the Mayflower but he's an early settler"), and arbitration should be 
truly voluntary: employees should not be subject to the duress of being 
required to agree to arbitrate all disputes in advance, which he 
compared to a "yellow dog" contract. Tobias pointed out serious 
problems he sees in subjecting statutory rights to arbitration -- for 
example, under civil rights laws one is entitled to a jury trial, 
emotional damages, and front pay. While arbitrators can order reins-
tatement, in his experience (in nonunion settings) 95 percent of 
employees do not want their jobs back. (Dunlop observed that they don't 
go back that frequently in the union world, under NLRB orders, either.) 
Employers fear jury trials. They can win arbitrations because 
discovery is limited, and employees need access to personnel records to 
prove patterns of discrimination, etc. in order to win discrimination 
cases. Arbitrators in nonunion situations don't know the law. 
Finally, Tobias advocated a national just cause statute; employers 
should be taught to be more humane; employee law centers should be 
created. In effect, we need "business agents" to handle discharges in 
the nonunion world. In response to the question of when an agreement 
to arbitrate should be made, he stated that it is only appropriate 
after an incident arises that is potentially subject to arbitration. 
He could devise a "dream" statute that would spell out all the con-
ditions for a fair system, (an in fact is working on it). The Chair 
expressed interest in seeing the result. 
Douglas S. McDowell, a Washington attorney, submitted a written 
statement on behalf of the Employment Policy Foundation (EPF). 
Responding to the prior witness, he said that he does respond to reason 
and moral suasion, despite the fact that he represents employers. The 
EPF's position has changed from insisting on (mandatory?) binding 
arbitration to agreeing to try voluntary arbitration. He urged that a 
national policy be adopted to encourage ADR but retain flexibility. 
Data cited in his paper noted the explosion in the EEOC caseload, with 
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some 90,000 complaints expected this year, in part due to the addition 
of disabilities act claims. The EEOC system is not working very well, 
although they had a pilot project, now lapsed, that provided for timely 
and outside mediation instead of by an internal investigator. The laws 
passed by Congress run ahead of the resources to enforce them (and, as 
the Chair noted at several points during the day, the money will never 
catch up.) Courts are turning to mediation in their own systems. 
[This point was made by several later witnesses as well, and the Chair 
asked to be educated. Professor Clyde Summers cited an article by 
Professor Leo Levin in the Fordham Law Review.] 
Attorney McDowell cited the availability of in-house dispute 
resolution systems, including so-called "open door" policies, ombuds-
men, peer review, and employee involvement (EI) plans of the kind the 
Commission had heard about in previous hearings. He noted the downside 
to using a plaintiff's attorney, including large legal fees. He said 
there is no "employer juggernaut" trying to impose arbitration on 
workers, it should be an option but not mandated on employers, and EI 
could be an alternative. He noted that the 1991 civil rights statute 
encourages ADR, and said that there are ways to remedy some of the 
potential weaknesses in having legal rights subject to arbitration, 
for instance, by ensuring diversity in panels, requiring written 
opinions, perhaps making it on optional route. He referred to a bill 
introduced by Senator Danforth that would require parties to undergo a 
60-day mediation period before court action (unclear whether this is 
before filing suit, before a hearing or before trial). The Commission 
will take a look at this bill. Commissioner Freeman asked how this 
could be mandated if one or both parties are adamantly opposed. 
McDowell stated that even parties in this position can learn from the 
observations of an outsider, and this may be particularly useful when 
an attorney has a different view than his/her client about the 
potential success of a case. 
Attorney Marsha S. Berzon Altshuler, Berzon Nussbaun Berzon and 
Rubin, who has represented workers and unions, spare on pitfalls of 
subjecting statutory rights to private arbitration. As distinct from 
grievance arbitration that has evolved under collective bargaining, 
where parties have input into both the rules (the CBA) and their 
enforcement (selection of neutral, etc), arbitration of statutes is not 
a total workplace governance system. The rules are public but the 
decisions are privatized. Berzon noted that arbitration under the 
collective bargaining system involves parties with (relatively) equal 
power to participate in its establishment; unions assist employees in 
going through the system; both sides are potential repeat customers of 
the arbitrators, so there is a natural tendency towards balanced 
decisions; decisions are often publicly reported so there is some 
carry-over to other cases that becomes the common law of the shop; and, 
finally, if the overall results are unsatisfactory, the actual rules 
can be changed. 
Attorney Berzon would contrasted the above system with ADR that is 
elected before a dispute arises: inadequate discovery is provided; the 
varying laws that grant enforceable rights also have varying procedural 
standards to balance efficiency versus fairness, whereas making them 
subject to a private arbitration exerts a leveling effect whose primary 
goal seems to be efficiency. It tosses all disputes into one box. 
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Employers may argue that the alternate system saves costs, but they are 
counting on lower damage awards than are likely to result from a jury 
trial. Individual employees are not repeat users of the system, 
employers are the only repeat customers in nonunion systems, so there 
is an inherent impetus for the arbitrator to tilt awards in favor of 
management. Of course transaction costs are lower for both parties, 
but since they are of unequal bargaining power (how can an individual 
employee know enough to select a particular arbitrator?) a pre-incident 
waiver of statutory rights is, in Berzon's view, inherently 
involuntary. 
Finally, Berzon asked what does it do to the legal system to push 
these decisions underground? The entire body of law in sexual harass-
ment might never have developed if cases had been decided piecemeal and 
the results hidden. Parties might have been involved in litigating the 
same issues over and over, whereas under a public law system they learn 
what the rules are. 
Mary P. Rowe, adjunct professor of management at MIT and its long-
time Ombudsperson, described in some detail the workings of this in-
house system. (Perhaps the term was changed from Ombudsman after she 
was addressed as "embalmsman.") The MIT system covers management 
employees, nonunion workers, students, and unionized employees with 
respect to problems not covered by the CBA. The office keeps no formal 
records, but does maintain statistics. Clients are referred to as 
"visitors," not complainants. The matters resolved are often delicate, 
including peer relationships, student to student harassment, and cases 
in which there is justified fear of reprisals. 
Professor Rowe endorsed the position that a public law system is 
important to the enforcement of statutory rights, and that if binding 
arbitration is used it should have equal input from employers and 
employees in its design, and decisions should be publicized within the 
workplace. She urged greater attention to the consideration of the 
relatedness of internal and external dispute resolution systems. She 
argued that labor law should be amended to shield internal problem-
solving of the kind she does from subpoena in subsequent litigation. 
She noted that under the Federal Administrative Disputes Resolution Act 
of 1990, neutrals are so protected. 
Among the features of a good system (and this apparently describes 
the MIT one) are that it covers a wide spectrum of subjects, including 
crimes; it covers all personnel, individually or in groups (presumably 
with the aforementioned exclusion of unit employees with respect to CBA 
issues): resources and advice are provided to all parties; staff are 
diverse; the system is taught to all; reprisals are proscribed; and the 
operations of the system are monitored and evaluated. Rowe urged that 
the Department of Labor be given the role supporting the design of such 
systems in all workplaces. In response to Freeman's questions about 
the cost of the system, which has handled about 20,000 cases in about 
20 years, Rowe said she will provide the data "in excessive detail." 
Lewis Maltby, Director of the ACLU's national task force on civil 
liberties in the workplace, stated that he is in the middle ground 
regarding ADR. His organization receives about 50,000 complaints a 
year from employees who think employers have violated their rights. 
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Most people with employment disputes don't get them resolved, and 
therefore there is a need to expand the scope of workplace justice in 
the US. But ADR has the inherent potential for abuse because of 
deficiencies highlighted by prior witnesses, such as the lack of 
discovery, true neutrals and bilateral input. Maltby also joined other 
witnesses in arguing that it is unreasonable to require a waiver of 
rights in favor of what might turn out to be "kangaroo courts." A 
truly voluntary system that meets minimum standards of fairness --
notice, access to information, genuinely neutral decision-makers --
should be subject to the law of the marketplace: that is, employees 
should be allowed to select or reject it freely. 
The composition of the judges' pool may stack the deck even if 
there is no actual conflict of interest, given the inherent imbalance 
of power and knowledge between the employer and an individual employee. 
Maltby's conclusion was that the basic law of the workplace is employ-
ment at will "despite all the ink that's been spilled writing about 
the exceptions." He'd even argue to take the selection of arbitrators 
out of the hands of the parties and to provide for post-employment 
election of a dispute procedure that is kept secret until a dispute 
arises. 
Reference was made to a Weiler idea that selection of the neutral 
could be in the hands of the parties if the employees have an indepen-
dent organization, with an institutional memory. In general, the com-
mitment of lawmakers is needed to guarantee a fair system. In response 
to an inquiry from the Chair, Maltby clarified that about a quarter of 
the total of 200,000 yearly complaints received by the ACLU relate to 
employment questions. Asked for data on the complaints, Maltby 
observed that a federal grant to computerize their system would be 
welcomed, and that statistics are compiled manually from figures sub-
mitted by the 50 state offices. He agreed to write a letter to the 
Commission describing the organization's experience over a period of 
years. 
The Chair returned to the theme of overburdened courts and 
administrative agencies, which have been given the responsibility for 
enforcing substantive rights created by Congress without the resources 
to do so. He cited figures showing a five-fold increase in employment 
law cases in US district courts in the 20 years between 1971 and 1991, 
and the DOL's large and increasing workload: What should the Commis-
sion do about this dilemma, Since Congress is clearly not going to 
appropriate enough money? Ms. Rowe replied that this is a good reason 
to look to internal dispute resolution systems. 
Commissioner Fraser remarked that if the employees who were 
complaining to the ACLU belonged to unions, there would be no need for 
the panel now before him. The panel was asked to comment on whether 
ADR should have the force of law. Maltby replied that employers have 
enough incentives to use it. He observed that Gilmer is a "judicial 
train wreck" and the law should set standards. Bakaly stated that 
courts aren't going to permit alternative systems to be binding if 
they're unfair. They'll be created by the common law. The holding 
under Gardner-Denver was that collectively-bargained processes can't 
resolve sex, age and other similar cases. Unions were defendants in 
early civil rights cases. Because of the changes since then there may 
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be a need to revisit that case. There is still a problem with a 
multiplicity of forums. Employers are willing to give due process in 
order to get one final binding decision. McDowell, too, argued that 
unfair systems will not be accepted by employees. 
In response to observations by the Chair about the enormous amount 
of regulation of the American workplace, as exemplified by the large 
number of cases litigated under the wage-hour law, McDowell noted the 
Department of Labor's (DOL's) pilot project on ADR but also cited a 
Supreme Court decision that an individual may not settle a (FLSA?) case 
without DOL approval. Should there be a system of labor courts, as 
some have suggested? Commissioner Kochan asked whether the large 
number of administrative agencies might not argue in favor of a one-
stop employment dispute agency, a more streamlined administrative 
process to parallel the availability of ADR. Bakaly said he was 
concerned about adding another administrative layer, and argued that 
ADR can solve the problem of multiplicity of forums, and that the 
criticisms of it raised by other witnesses can be resolved by such 
means as making awards public. 
Attorney McDowell stated that when the administration of the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act were moved to 
EEOC, the caseload didn't drop. In response to Kochan's question of 
whether he would want one administrative forum, he said that it might 
not be politically feasible, but some consolidation may be possible, 
Maltby stated that consolidation is attractive, and that ADR seems to 
be a necessary evil. He remains concerned about the privatization of 
civil rights enforcement, which "isn't the same as privatization of 
trash collection." Tobias pointed out that public expectations have 
risen with regard to workplace justice, contributing to the movement 
for a national just cause statute. The Commission should try to 
persuade Congress to do right, but, if this does not succeed, then it 
needs to educate companies. He recounted dealing with an officer of a 
Fortune 500 company who had never heard of mediation or arbitration. 
"Outside California, a lot of education needs to be done." 
Attorney Bakaly stated that a system needs to be in effect for 
future disputes. Commissioner Freeman asked what happens at MIT if 
cases are not resolved. Rowe responded that various types of ADR are 
employed and that in some 20 years only three cases went to trial, 
which MIT won; "Of course, a system is only as good as its next five 
years." Kochan stated that it is clear parties need to be involved in 
design of the system. Making the link to prior hearings, he observed 
that employee involvement in a nonunion setting to design such a system 
would probably be illegal. Under the common law the law of the shop 
grew out of the union system. The question is how to bring employees 
into the system and build on what we've learned. Maltby referred the 
Commission to the ACLU's Electromation brief, which pointed out ways to 
interpret 8(a) (2) to permit such EI. Dunlop noted the Commission has 
this brief. McDowell said that employers should be able to set up ADR 
without violating the NLRA; he mentioned the ongoing controversy over 
mandated health and safety committees under the OSHA reform 
legislation. 
The afternoon session began with a presentation by Judith L. 
Lichtman, President of the Women's Legal Defense Fund, accompanied by 
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Heidi Hartmann, Executive Director, Institute for Women's Policy 
Research, Francine Moccio, Assistant Executive Director of the YWCA, 
and Sheila B. Coates, President of Black Women United for Action. 
Lichtman stated that one of the major changes in the work force has 
been the vastly increased participation of women, yet their earnings 
and opportunities lag behind men's. Contingent workers have also 
increased, and these are mostly women. As demonstrated by papers 
presented to the October labor law conference sponsored by the Women's 
Bureau, unionism benefits women, and therefore barriers to effective 
union organization impede women. Labor law should be amended to 
ensure, for example, the sharing of salary information so that pay 
inequities can be attacked openly. There are practical and structural 
obstacles to unionizing of women, for example because of their 
prevalence in temporary jobs, etc. With respect to ADR, Lichtman 
asserted that employers shouldn't be able to coerce a choice between 
one's job and the statutory right to be free of discrimination. 
Standards for a fair system are spelled out on page 25 of her written 
statement, including that the system must be fully voluntary, neutrals 
should have expertise in EEO law, and certain situations such as class 
actions or those involving significant policy questions are ill-suited 
for ADR. 
Dr. Hartman referred to the WB papers and said that the Commission 
should make more time to hear from women's groups and representatives 
of other disadvantaged people. Moccio noted the difficulty of many 
unions in getting to a first contract after recognition is finally 
achieved. She said the panel was "not here as QWL-busters" but to 
bring a breath of reality to the proceedings. Coates stated that real 
gains for employment of women of color have occurred only in the public 
sector. Labor law reform, she believes, should include stronger 
enforcement of civil rights acts and the NLRA. Commissioner Marshall 
asked what should be done about the dilemma that the labor laws were 
crafted in a time and under assumptions that don't accommodate a 
contingent workforce (e.g. they postulated mass production industries 
providing stable employment for, basically, white men.) Lichtman 
replied, that much attention needs to be paid to the definition of 
employee, and that an ongoing DOL study examining independent con-
tractors should be useful (Dunlop: the Commission has full accesses to 
that study). 
Commissioner Kochan stated that the panel seemed ambivalent about 
ADR and that it should do some more thinking about what alternative 
system would well serve working women. Critics of the process need to 
suggest design principles. Lichtman replied that she was not 
ambivalent about ADR: that under some circumstances it can work, but 
she would strongly oppose a system that deprives workers of their legal 
rights. To the standards mentioned in her paper she would add a fifth: 
to prohibit the requirement tho choose the use of arbitration prospect-
ively. Kochan asked if there is a dispute resolution system that would 
enhance the rights of women. The response was there are a host of 
union-developed committees to review matters voluntarily before going 
to the grievance system. But the notion of an employer-developed 
system to review employer sins smacks of 1930s company unionism. There 
needs to be equal representation on both sides. 
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The final panel featured presentations and reaction by law 
professors Clyde Summers (Emeritus, University of Pennsylvania); 
Katherine Stone, Cornell University; Theodore St. Antoine, University 
of Michigan; and Leroy Clark, Catholic University, Summers noted that 
he has a 120 page article on the topic that takes essentially the 
following positions: Arbitration as part of ADR is unacceptable to 
redress legal rights unless it is voluntary and agreed to only after a 
dispute arises. If individual legal rights are to be arbitrated, the 
differences with grievance arbitration should be noted: grievance 
arbitration has been through a sort of discovery in the preliminary 
investigative process, development of facts at early stages; for many 
top arbitrators, deciding legal rights is not their expertise: a 
special panel of neutrals should be provided. Because of the "repeat 
customer" factor, grievance arbitrators are appropriately selected by 
striking names (from, e.g., FMCS or AAA panels), but under a nonunion 
system selection should be by rotation from a special panel. 
Professor Summers too cited existing arbitration required in the 
federal district courts in Philadelphia: three panels of lawyers give 
awards that are not binding but which are useful in indicating to 
parties their likelihood of success in court. Fewer than three percent 
of cases end up in court. Montana has a general unjust discharge 
statute that permits either party to request arbitration. The refusing 
party must pay attorney fees if it loses in court. But arbitration is 
almost never used: Summers wondered if this is "just Montana," or if 
it will take more time for the litigation syndrome to wear off. 
Summers concluded that unions can represent employees, fpr example in 
enforcing legal rights, even if they haven't achieved majority 
recognition status. The Commission should urge unions "to get off 
their duffs" and start representing employees without NLRB elections. 
Professor Stone stated her view that courts have shown too much 
deference to arbitration. The waiver of statutory rights potentially 
nullifies any effort to legislate on behalf of workers. The role of 
arbitrators is said to be the central feature of our collective 
bargaining system, yet CBAs are not contracts entitled to judicial 
protection. Her testimony noted some of the same defects of subjecting 
legal rights to arbitration that were cited by other witnesses: lack 
of due process; no effective right of appeal; inadequate remedies; 
invisible decisions; no political accountability. The basis of the 
Steelworkers trilogy was that CBA arbitrators have a special knowledge 
of the law of the shop. This expertise does not apply when the subject 
is statutory rights. 
The conventional wisdom holds that arbitration is more supportive 
of an ongoing relationship, faster, cheaper, etc., but there is 
actually little data on this. This concept of workplace democracy may 
not accord with reality. The preeminence of the CBA may have a 
paradoxical effect in that there has been a vast expansion in the 
preemptive scope of section 301 of Taft-Hartley in state courts (much 
broader than the preemptive effect given to other laws) so that 
unorganized workers may now have more protections for employment rights 
than union workers, given the explosion in new statutory rights in 
state law (e.g., privacy). While statutory rights have been thus 
extinguished, the growing weakness of many unions means that they 
cannot obtain strong protections for workers through collective 
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bargaining. Stone's specific recommendations include legislation to 
state that section 301 is not intended to preempt state and federal 
statutory protections, to reaffirm the broad interpretation of the 
Federal Arbitration Act's exclusion of employment contracts (and 
reverse Gilmer). Commissioner Freeman asked whether "second-class 
justice is worse than zero class justice." Stone stated she would 
prefer to address the problem by designing a streamlined judicial 
procedure, adopting methods such as small claims court processes, 
calendar preferences, and possible courts of special labor expertise. 
Professor St. Antoine began by noting that at this late stage in 
the day one should not expect much imaginative novelty, to which the 
Chair replied that the Commission is looking for wisdom, not novelty. 
The witness apologized for indulging in his "own private frolic" but 
mentioned his involvement in the Uniform Laws Commission Draft Model 
Employment Termination Act project. (see my notes on the working group 
meeting in East Lansing, October 13, 1993, where St. Antoine also 
spoke.) He noted that some 60 million employees in the US are subject 
to the employment at will doctrine, and we are the only major 
industrialized democracy in that condition, flying in the face of the 
ILO's recommendation that all employees be subject to good cause 
dismissal protections. Exceptions to the doctrine are observed by 
about 45 jurisdictions, so that employees can at least challenge 
dismissals in court (employees win about three-fourths of cases heard 
by juries). The model act provides a sensible tradeoff by protecting 
employee rights while eliminating crushing damage awards. However, the 
act, introduced in about 12 states thus far is "not going anywhere 
fast." Therefore, a bold measure by this Commission would be to 
recommend a national just cause statute, to put us in line with every 
civilized country and eliminate state by state competition based on 
business climate. 
Professor St. Antoine also urged the group to think boldly and to 
address employer objections that they are not troubled that employees 
have rights but object to the number of procedures employers must go 
through to justify their decisions to terminate. The Commission should 
consider a merger of key federal agencies, at least those (EEOC and 
NLRB) concerned with remedying discrimination. 
In response to a dissent from Stone about the skepticism with 
which labor lawyers view the alleged "freedom of contract" of 
individual employees, St. Antoine noted that the uniform law commission 
rejected an amendment that would have limited the selection of arbitra-
tion to after the dispute arises. "Political reality" supports the 
impression that employees should be given the freedom to contract for 
arbitration in advance. He believes that the employer's savvy about 
the selection of arbitrators is overstated. (He cited someone who had 
chosen HIM because he was a "Saint.") He stated that we don't presently 
know the limits of Gilmer or the weight that will be accorded to awards 
under other circumstances. He urged that Gilmer be extended and 
Gardner-Denver be cut back, and he cited three influential Federal 
judges who agree with this position, including former colleague at 
Michigan Judge Harry T. Edwards of the DC Circuit. Judge Edwards used 
to be opposed to arbitration of legal rights but changed his mind (even 
with respect to unorganized workers) because of his experience on the 
bench. 
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Arbitration is a less hostile environment and if reinstatement is 
sought, it works more meaningfully if it is the result of arbitration, 
not litigation. Arbitration should, however have the power under the 
agreement to provide statutory remedies, and St. Antoine would question 
any agreement that says the arbitrator does not have that power. 
Remedies may be a matter of public policy, but he has not made up his 
mind on whether agreements that bar such remedies should be permitted. 
St. Antoine strongly agrees with Stone that the courts have gone too 
far with respect to 301 preemption, and that the Supreme Court handed 
down a simple minded, perverse interpretation. He referred the 
Commission to an article by Michael Harper of Boston University. In 
sum, in his view ADR does save time, money, and psychic wear and tear. 
Professor Clark shares Summers's and Stone's skepticism about 
arbitration, especially in employment discrimination areas. Care 
should be taken if an ADR system is set up, to structure it fairly, and 
to consider issues such as the scope of discovery and who pays the 
arbitrator: if the employer pays, he doesn't really have to pay too 
much attention to whom he chooses. Arbitrators are often embarrassed 
if the employer is represented by counsel and the plaintiff is pro se. 
Clark would like to see research on parallel complaints traveling 
through the two systems, comparing costs and levels of satisfaction. 
He noted that the 1991 civil rights statute stated that arbitration 
should be explored "where feasible." He finds Gardner-Denver 
attractive for one reason --if employers want a cheaper process, they 
should get to that result through a system that, into which employees 
buy. The choice should be voluntary. Employment discrimination is a 
qualitatively different situation. The case may involve ""layoffs 
because of the economic situation, not truly discrimination. Arbitra-
tion can be used to wash out such cases. Commissioner Voos asked if 
just cause legislation would reduce litigation in discrimination cases. 
Union-based cases would still go to the NLRB, while other federal and 
state law claims would be treated under the model law. 
Chairman Dunlop asked the panel to thing about the implications of 
Congress creating rights without enforcement, with backlogs growing 
like wildfire and the breakdown of "business as usual." St. Antoine 
said this was a strong argument to permit and authorize voluntary 
procedures. Summers responded that one reason we have so many laws and 
litigated cases in this country is that US employers have rejected 
collective bargaining. If the workers were 40 percent unionized, we'd 
have one-third the number of cases. The costs of litigation have been 
underestimated, moreover, since many lawyers won't start a case unless 
a recovery of at least $25,000 is anticipated. Some legal enforcement 
results in transaction costs to 75 percent. Dunlop said he had been 
educated today regarding the cautions of moving arbitration from the 
field of CBAs to public rights, and asked if court sponsored "mini-
arbitration" might be expanded. 
Professor Stone suggested that the Commission might raise the 
resource problem in its reports. Arbitration can be used as an adjunct 
to the court system but this is not similar to private arbitration 
because it retains full judicial review and has none of the other due 
process shortcomings. A court- or statutorily-authorized arbitration 
as adjunct to a public process could be useful, but one subject to 
public scrutiny, not a privatized system. Dunlop noted that the 
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present system isn't capable of taking care of the volumes of cases 
involved without a major restructuring. He asked about the usefulness 
of employment tribunals such as in Great Britain, or labor courts as 
used in other nations. St. Antoine said that the idea of a National 
Employment Relations Board would simplify the process for employers, 
employees and unions, but it wouldn't by itself solve budgetary 
problems. He cited sage advice once given him that no public agency 
should undertake too many unpopular tasks, or it will end up with no 
budget at all. The woeful conclusion may be that "American taxpayers 
don't want to pay for civilization." 
Professor Summers asserted that industrial tribunals won't solve 
our problems. They are more costly and time-consuming than labor 
courts. What about "justice?" Nothing in any other country equals the 
fairness of our grievance arbitration system. Summers said that the 
Commission is "not David:" "It isn't capable of solving massive 
problems without resources." The Commission, he challenged, should say 
that "Congress is acting like frauds." Stone, on the other hand, would 
explore the special tribunal route, as long as it's public and 
publicly accountable. 
Chairman Dunlop stated that when he ran the wage and price control 
program, regulations provided that any case should be appealed only to 
one circuit court in DC -- a de facto specialization that worked very 
well. What about a separate circuit court for employment cases, with 
an appeal to that Supreme Court only on the basis of a constitutional 
question? Summers replied that there would be advantages to concentra-
tion in one circuit but that there would still be diversity at the 
trial level. A labor court system with special procedures designed for 
efficiency might be desirable, but it's going to cost money. St. 
Antoine noted that most cases get no farther than the circuit court 
level, and state his preference for specialization at the district 
level and review by generalists. 
Commissioner Kochan said that the discussion had been very helpful 
but that everyone seemed to be seeing only a little piece of the 
problem. We need a more integrated solution: effective workplace 
representation and dispute resolution, better internal processes, 
development of expertise in private arbitrators, and judicial and 
public processes that ensure the effective enforcement of public 
rights. He expressed the view that it's all that complicated, but 
requires a return to first principles. Summers said that an effective 
employee representation system is required for effective internal 
dispute resolution processes. "Once the lawyers get their hands on it, 
it's a problem." He'd prefer unions, but if not, then some form of 
employee representation plan. St. Antoine agreed with Kochan's con-
tention that it wouldn't be hard to train a cadre of arbitrators in 
statutory cases. The same types of factual questions are presented, 
and they would not find that much difficulty in dealing with these 
cases. 
The Chair thanked the professors for pushing back the frontiers 
of ignorance and welcomed their wisdom and inventiveness to deal with 
these questions when the commission iadches the stage of making 
recommendations. 
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The discussion havincr concluH^H <-u • 
ing at approximately 4:30 « „ * C h a i r m a n Dunlop p.m. adjourned the 
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